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STATEMENT of the CASE
Late in 19991 did inform Mr. Anglin, a creditor of some of the parties of the Global
Settlement Agreement, that he might be able to collect some of his debt by garnishing
funds coming to me. Mr. Anglin is not a party of the Global Settlement, and had no
contractual impediment to collecting this debt. Mr. Anglin is an acquiantance of a
friend; 1 have had very limited dealings with him. However, with my help me he lent to
some of the parties $10,000., funds that came from a settlement having to do with the
death of one of his children. Attempting to collect this legal debt infuritated the parties
that worked so hard to elude creditors, and especially Mr. Jensen (see addendum 1)
because the money was to be paid to him (revealed at 11-15-99 garnishment hearing).
Judge Bohling ruled that the receivorship would have to be reopened to proceed. Mr.
Anglin simply ceased his collection efforts. Mr. Jensen sued him for attorney's fees,
lost, appealed to the Supreme Court and lost without any repsonse form Mr. Anglin.
Concurrently in December 1999, Mr. Jensen sued me for breach of contract. This is
the third suit the parties have brought against me, and no wrongdoing on my part has
been proven, nor occurred.
As Ronald Dunn explained (R. 461, items 3,4) we were late filing counterclaims
due to a life threatening medical emergency. The last thing I wanted to do was start
another lawsuit. I was told we should start the countersuit and then have it
consolidated, allowing the claims to be considered in one suit. Not allowing the claims
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to be submitted under the circumstances was unfair. Trying to maintain a reasonable
course under the circumstances has been difficult and not entirely successful.
Meanwhile, the breach of contract suit was defeated when Judge Peuler ruled in
my favor, granting judgment for attorney's fees. After almost 2 years of litigation, and
numerous post judgment motions, Mr. Jensen accused Judge Peuler of bias. While
denying bias, Judge Peuler recused herself. Rather than deciding the remaining
motions, Judge Medley reversed Judge Peuler and we started all over. Judge
Medley eventually made several rulings that made a final ruling in our favor most
likely, and we were set for a hearing on 9-9-02, when Custom Steel filed for Chapter 7
bankruptcy on 8-16-02. At any rate, none of the claims by Mr. Jensen of breach,
conspiracy, etc. have been proved in court and are baseless.
For the record, re: 3rd cause of action, Randy Isaacson's Affidavit (Exhibit C of
"Applicant's Memorandum in Support of Its Motion to Intervene as a Defendant and
Strike Hearing, filed 7-9-96, Case No. 960902152CV) states that,"... the factor could
look to CFM as a guarantor of each invoice, since CFM provided a warranty that each
invoice was good for the face amount." (Pg. 2, #7) On pg. 3, #9 he says,"... Clean
Gas is ready to pay $30,217", and the invoice is the same one that is contested in this
action. This refutes counsel's arguments at R. 329, #4 and R. 414, III, which by the
highlighting I believe the judge relied heavily upon. I did not find this evidence until
shortly after the final judgment, but decided appealing was pointless.
-2-

STATEMENT of FACTS
1. Mr. Jensen had assigned to himself (Addendum 2,1 was unable to find where it
is in the Record) on 11-05-01, proceeds from this and other cases. This makes him
the party in interest, at least from that date, as he has also been since his filing Case
No. 990911896, the preceeding proceeding, having obtained a 'Release' that walks
and talks like an assignment in August of 1999.
2. Shortly after Mr. Jensen's obtaining the 11-05-01 Assignment, Custom Steel filed
for Chapter 11, trial court being notified of automatic stay on 11-27-01 (R. 437). As
successfully argued by Mr. Lyons, counsel I retained in Idaho, Custom Steel had an
interest in this case, and Bankruptcy Judge Pappas' ordered parties to cease
collection efforts on 3-13-02 (R. 527). The Chapter 11 was dismissed on 4-10-02.
3. The Chapter 11 deposition, brought by Mr. Jensen in attempt to be appointed
special counsel, shows that the only party that has an agreement with him is Custom
Steel, and no one else has paid him or retained him. R. 508, #4 summarizes, refers to
pp. 100-102 of deposition.
4. Since approximately 11-10-01,1 had a judgment against Custom Steel in excess
of $30,000, arising from Case No. 990911543, Judge Dever's court.
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SUMMARY of ARGUMENT
The only issue is the amount awarded for attorney fees. And the only issue on
amounts awarded for attorney fees is clear abuse of discretion. Cafferty v. Hughes,
2002 UT, App 105, which is primarily concerned with a number of aspects of attorney
fees and incorporates Dixie State Bank v. Bracken and Valcarce v. Fitzgeraldis right
on point. The majority of arguments presented before appeal, if not all, presented by
both sides, have no weight, and the judge was proper in not granting us an
evidentiary hearing. Generally, although there is a question about the judge's editing,
there is no clear abuse of discretion.
ARGUMENT
I refer to Cafferty v. Hughes, 2002 UT, App 105, Case No. 20000866-CA (filed
April 11,2002): ' [par] 26 "Calculation of reasonable attorney fees is in the sound
discretion of the trial court, and will not be overturned in the absence of a showing of a
clear abuse of discretion." Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah
1988) (citation omitted). "A trial court's discretion in determining the amount of a
reasonable attorney fees arises from the fact that it is in a better position than an
appellate court to gauge the quality and efficiency of the representation and the
complexity of the litigation.'" Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 317 (Utah 1998)
(quoting Richard Barton Enters, v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 380 (Utah 1996))',...'Dixie,
764 P.2d at 990 (footnotes omitted). In this analysis, "what an attorney bills... is not
-4-

determinative." Id. "The appropriateness of the work actually performed and of the
attorney's billing rate is evaluated before a reasonable fee is set." Id. Accordingly,
"[t]he trial court is not bound by the fees requested in the claimant's affidavit

"

N.A.R., Inc. v. Marcek, 2000UTApp 300, 11, 13 P.3d 612. In addition, the
evidence regarding a reasonable attorney fee does not have to be disputed in order
for a trial court to award a lower amount. See Beckstrom v. Beckstrom, 578 P. 2d
520, 524 (Utah 1978) ("Even though [the reasonableness of the attorney fee]
evidence is undisputed, the trial judge was not necessarily compelled to accept such
self-interested testimony whole cloth and make such an award; and in the absence of
patent error or clear abuse of discretion, this court will not disturb his findings or
judgment." (footnote omitted)).
Clearly, Mr. Jensen's records are not determinative. Neither is the judge's 5-18-01
approval of attorney fees (R. 208) an approval of Mr. Jensen's hourly rate. The only
issue on this issue is did Judge Dever abuse his discretion.
Although Judge Dever heavily edited Mr Jensen's document, (R. 484-486) the
judge's own entry of the judgment amount speaks for itself. This is bouyed by Judge
Dever's subsequent "Denial of First Order and Judgment to Augment Original
Judgment" (R. 628), wherein he writes in his own hand "finding that fees are
unreasonable". It is not uncommon for judges to cut fees, sometimes by more than
50%, and this worked to Mr. Jensen's personal benefit in another case before Judge
-5-

Dever. The amount the judge meant is clear, in his own hand, inline with what Judge
Dever has done, and what other judges have decided. Clear abuse is not present.
Some of the factors the judge may have considered include:
1. My 'intransigence' is an effort to keep from being held in contempt of Federal
Bankruptcy Court automatic stay. Due to Mr Jensen's efforts in violation of the
automatic stay I was forced to retain counsel in Idaho; Judge Pappas eventually
ordering all parties to cease collection efforts (R. 527). See Ron Dunn's arguments on
application of the automatic stay to the suit at R. 506-509. I'm sure Mr. Jensen
claims Judge Pappas' order didn't apply to him or whichever parties he didn't want it to
apply, but I certainly don't want to be standing beside him to explain to Judge Pappas.
2. Mr. Jensen is the party in interest here, and since he is primarily looking after his
own interest, is not generally entitiled to fees. This conduct is a violation of the Rules
of Professional Conduct, 1.8(j).
3. Judge Dever, aware of the 2 other suits in 3rd District Court and the Chapter 11,
doubtless realized Mr. Jensen was trying to get his fees in a way that the fees would
not be preferential, while making creditor's judgments worthless.
4. Re: Issue No.2: It is certainly clear what the judge meant in his order denying
augmenting the original judgment (R. 628). Also the judge had to deal with the
improper Bench Warrant for my arrest brought by Mr. Jensen, the judge quashing it on
6-13-02 (R. 621).
-6-

CONCLUSION
I cannot find clear abuse of discretion, just an editing discrepancy that Mr. Jensen
is desperately trying to exploit. The theme of Mr. Jensen's practice is extracting fees.
This motive is apparent throughout this and the preceeding suit. He has not pursued
his client's best interest (unless he admits he is his own client) nor has he acted as an
officer of the court. He has used the courts to satisfy a personal vendetta. I have not
always defended myself well. I have tried to stay with the issues, and even then most
likely have traveled outside of what is allowed by this Court. If so, I apologize. 1 also
have not responded to every erroneous statement Mr. Jensen has made. We request
that the Court affirm Judge Dever's appealed decisions. We request that Mr. Jensen
be sanctioned.

Dated

Steven C. Blevins

Debra Kay Blevins
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CERTIFICATION of SERVICE
1, Steven Blevins certify that on
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\ served two copies

of the attached Appellee's Brief upon Michael A. Jensen, the counsel for the apellant
in the is matter, by mailing them to him by first class mail with sufficient postage
prepaid to the following address:
Michael A. Jensen
PO Box 571708
Salt Lake City, UT 84157-1708
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AND hand delivered 8 copies to the Court of Appeals on
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Affidavit of Attorney Joseph J. Huggins

RONALD L. DUNN, ESQ. - 4312
RONALD L. DUNN, P.C.
68 South Main, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone (801) 521-3800
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION, INC.,
et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.,
STEVEN C. BLEVINS and DEBRA KAY
BLEVINS,
Defendants.

AFFIDAVIT OF JOSEPH J. HUGGINS
Case No. 990911896-CV
Honorable Sandra N. Peuler
District Judge

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Joseph J. Huggins, being first duly sworn, hereby deposes and says:
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Utah.
2. I was retained by Mark Anglin to collect, if possible, a debt owed him by
Contracting Fabrication Machining, Inc., which I attempted by obtaining a prejudgment writ of
garnishment, which I then had served upon Steven C. Blevins in Case No. 990911095-DC,
Anglin v. Contracting Fabrication Machining, Inc. aka CFM, Inc. (the "Garnishment
Proceeding").
3. Shortly prior to November 29, 1999, I attended a hearing in the Garnishment
Proceeding, also attended by Michael A. Jensen, Esq., attorney for Custom Steel Fabrication,
Inc., the intervenor opposing the garnishment.
4. Shortly after the hearing, Mr. Jensen stated to me that he would make my client and
Mr. Blevins pay for trying to garnish the $6,667, no matter how long it took and no matter

how much it might cost.
DATED April SO>, 2001.

Joseph J. Huafgins, Esq.

/

V

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME April ^ 3 , 2001.

Notary Public
My Commission:

SERVICE CERTIFICATE
I certify that on April ^ " 7 , 2001, I caused to be deposited in the United States mails,
postage prepaid, the above-described document and this certificate, addressed to:
Michael A. Jensen, Esq.
PO Box 571708
(730 Three Ftns. # 87)
SLC,
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Tab 2

Assignment to Michael A. Jensen

ASSIGNMENT OF INTEREST
WHEREAS Custom Steel Fabrication, Inc. ("Custom") has since 1996 retained
Michael A. Jensen ("Attorney") as its legal counsel in various litigation matters; and
WHEREAS Custom has not folly paid for legal services rendered by Attorney; and
WHEREAS Custom has certain funds owed to it by Steven C. and Debra Kay
Blevins (the "Blevins"); and
WHEREAS such funds are comprised of (1) $10,000 on deposit with the Third
District Court, Case No. 990911896; (2) $7,000 owed as restitution from the Blevins
based on Custom's payment of that amount on judgment in Caj>e No. 990911896 that is
now vacated ("Vacated Judgment"); and (3) $1,330 from a judgment against the Blevins
in Case No. 000906072 and which amount was unilaterally offset by the Blevins from the
Vacated Judgment and which amount is now owed to Custom (collectively "Funds").
WHEREAS Custom expects the Third District Court, Case No. 990911896 and
also Case No. 000906072, to enter oue or more orders requiring the Blevins to pay the
Funds in part or all to Custom or to its Attorney Client Trust Account.
THEREFORE, to ensure that the Funds are used exclusively to pay part of
Custom's debt with Attorney, Custom agrees to assign, and hereby does assign to
Attorney all its interest in the Funds as described and set forth above. Custom further
agrees that this assignment is effective immediately and irrevocable and without recourse.
Custom also acknowledges that this assignment does not by itself discharge or satisfy
Custom's debt with Attorney, but that such debt will be reduced only to the extent the
Funds, or part of such Funds, are received by Attorney.
DATED this 5th day of November 2001.
Custom Steel Fabrication, Inc

By: Heidi Bishop, Ownerand Director
On the 5^ day of November 2001, personally appeared before me, both of the
above individuals, Wendy Garamendi and Heidi Bishop, the signers of the within
Assignment, who acknowledged to me that theydid execute the same and that the contents
thereof were true, accurate and complete to the best of their information and belief.
^ i f > * ^
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RULA J. THOMAS

fARY PUBLIC

STATE OF IDAHO
NOTARY —
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